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Summary 
Redistribution is an inevitable feature of collective pension schemes. It is still largely an open 
question what people‘s preferences are regarding redistribution—both through pensions schemes 
as well as more generally. It would seem that economists have little to say about this question, as 
they routinely assume that people are predominantly selfish. Economic experiments have 
revealed, however, that most people do in fact have redistributional preferences that are not 
merely inspired by self-interest. This paper reviews this experimental evidence. For that purpose 
we distinguish between three fundamentally different types of situations. The first deals with 
distributional preferences behind a veil of ignorance. What type of income distribution do people 
prefer when they do not know whether they will end up in an advantaged or disadvantaged 
position? A main result here is that, contrary to what John Rawls suggested, people do not prefer 
the maximin rule, but rather favor a utilitarian justice concept appended with a safety net for the 
poorest. Another result is that people are willing to accept income inequalities—as long as these 
are due to choices for which people can be held accountable. In the second type of situation, 
individuals make choices in front of the veil of ignorance and know their position. Experiments 
show that preferences for redistribution are strongly dependent on a person‘s own position. People 
in a relatively disadvantaged position want more redistribution than those in a relatively 
advantaged position, which shows that preferences for redistribution are clearly affected by self-
interest. Still, even many of those in an advantaged position display a preference for 
redistribution. This holds, in particular, if inequality is due to chance rather than effort. There are 
also significant differences in preferences between the genders and between people with different 
political orientations. Finally, we discuss situations in which income is determined by 
interdependent rather than individual choices. People are dependent upon the cooperation of 
others for the achievement of their (income) goals. Experiments show that behavioral factors such 
as trust and reciprocity play a crucial role, and they also indicate that these factors are strongly 
affected by the institutional setting. In the closing parts of the paper we discuss whether and how 
these experimental results speak to the redistribution issues of pensions. For example, do they 
argue for or against mandatory participation? Should we have less redistribution and more 
actuarial fairness? How does this depend on the type of redistribution involved? 
1. Introduction  
 
―A collective pension is always solidary‖, according to an advertisement of the world‘s 
biggest pension fund (APB). Obviously, the pension fund believes that people value 
solidarity positively. Broadly speaking, solidarity refers to ―a positive sense of shared fate 
between individuals or groups. That is, a situation where social relationships centre on 
the stronger helping the weaker or on promoting the communal interest‖ (van der Lecq 
and Steenbeek, 2007, p. 4). In the domain of pensions, solidarity can take place at 
different levels. A distinction can be made between risk solidarity, subsidizing solidarity 
and income solidarity. Risk solidarity is a consequence of risk sharing, and it implies that 
ex post the lucky support the unlucky. Subsidizing solidarity involves ex ante value 
transfers from one group to another—as is the case, for example, when longevity risk is 
expected to be larger for one group (women) than for another (men). Income solidarity 
usually implies that income is redistributed from the rich to the poor—as is the case, for 
instance, for old-age social security (AOW) in the Netherlands (where contributions are 
income-dependent, while benefits are not). Whatever its form, however, solidarity is 
always about redistribution (Centraal Planbureau, 2000).   
An important question is whether and why people support the redistribution 
embodied in collective pension schemes. Some forms of support may be rooted in self-
interest (such as redistribution resulting from risk solidarity, which is mutually 
advantageous when people are risk averse). Redistribution due to subsidizing- and 
income solidarity is advantageous for those on the receiving end. Hence, self-interest can 
explain these forms of redistribution, if one assumes that the groups who receive have the 
political power to pursue their interests at the expense of those who pay. Apart from the 
fact that this is a tenuous assumption, indeed, an attempt to explain redistribution merely 
on the basis of self-interest is too restricted a perspective. One should not rule out the 
possibility that many people do in fact have social preferences—that is, a genuine 
concern for the welfare of others and a preference for a just and fair distribution of 
incomes and risks. Increasing numbers of economists (or ―even economists‖, one could 
say) believe this to be the case. This belief is at least partly based on experimental 
evidence that has been collected in the last two decades or so.  
This paper reviews the experimental literature on social preferences, and 
discusses the implications for redistribution and pensions. We should mention, however, 
that few experimental studies directly address solidarity with regard to pension schemes. 
For example, several studies deal with plain distribution and redistribution, but few of 
them focus on such issues as subsidizing solidarity in risk sharing or solidarity across the 
generations. Still, we believe that the results from this literature can add some empirical 
evidence to pension reform discussions, which are all too often based on mere 
speculation about what people really prefer. Moreover, preferences regarding 
redistribution are important not only for debates about pensions, but also for fiscal policy 
and the welfare state (including healthcare, unemployment insurance, disability insurance 
and poverty alleviation).  
 In the experimental literature on ―other-regarding‖ preferences, three different 
kinds of settings (designs) can be distinguished. Inspired by Harsanyi (1955) and Rawls 
(1971), the first setting asks individuals to make decisions behind a veil of ignorance: this 
prevents them from knowing their own income position or even their own abilities. The 
goal is to assess the principles of distributive justice that people uphold when they are 
largely impartial to the outcome and not affected by their immediate self-interest. In the 
second setting, individuals make choices in front of the veil of ignorance: thus, they know 
whether they occupy a relatively advantaged or disadvantaged position. As a 
consequence, distributional preferences will be affected by self-interest. As we see, 
however, for many people self-interest is not the only guide for their decisions. Third, and 
finally, we review experiments in which individuals make decisions in strategic settings. 
The key feature here is that individuals interact with each other and are mutually 
dependent. An important question is whether people are willing and able to cooperate 
when there is tension between individual interest and collective interest.  
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief 
introduction to the methodology of experimental economics. Section 3 is the main body 
of the paper, providing an extensive review of the experimental literature that deals with 
social preferences and redistribution. Section 4 gives a summary and our interpretation of 
the main results. Section 5 outlines the important missing elements in the experimental 
literature with respect to issues of pension solidarity. Finally, Section 6 concludes and 
presents the main implications.  
 
 
2. The method of experimental economics 
 
In an economic experiment, human subjects make decisions in a controlled environment. 
The typical procedure is that potential participants (usually students) are invited, by email 
or otherwise, to take part in an experiment that can earn them money. Upon arrival, 
subjects are randomly allocated to one of the computers in the lab. They receive 
instructions about the experiment, on screen, on paper or verbally. The instructions give 
details about the ―rules of the game‖. They explain how a subject‘s earnings in the 
experiment will be affected by his or her own decisions and, possibly, by the decisions of 
other subjects, and by chance. Often there is a round of questions and a practice round to 
ensure that everyone understands the rules. Then the experiment starts in earnest, and 
subjects enter their decisions. Usually, they do this individually without convening with 
other participants. When all decisions are made, subjects are privately paid their 
individual earnings in cash. When all subjects have left, the experiment is over and the 
experimenter can start analyzing the data. 
The key issue of any experiment is control. The situation in which the subjects 
make their choices can be precisely controlled and varied by the experimenter. Just like in 
experimental physics, we do not wait for something to happen by accident, but we set up 
a situation that suits our purposes and observe the consequences. Experiments are used 
for a variety of purposes. The most prominent use is testing the predictions of economic 
models. By their nature, models are an abstraction of the complexities of real life. 
Therefore, field settings always involve a less than perfect match to the assumptions of a 
theory. In an experiment, the theoretical model and the actual decision environment can 
be brought more closely together. An experiment minimizes the need to make auxiliary 
assumptions on nuisance variables, and can focus on the key variables and mechanisms 
of interest. The data of the experiment can thus provide a clean test of the economic 
model. This is what is sometimes called ‗testing a theory on its own domain‘. A related 
advantage is that it is possible to make ceteris paribus comparisons. One variable can be 
changed at a time, and the consequences observed. Such comparisons are particularly 
important if one wants or needs to make causal inferences (because the observed effects 
are not flawed by endogeneity, selection effects or spuriousness). Experiments can also 
be used for ‗testbedding‘. Just as scale models of airplanes are tested in a wind tunnel, 
one can implement different policies and institutions in a controlled setting to examine 
and compare their performance. Experiments have been used, for example, to evaluate 
different tax systems (see, e.g., Riedl and van Winden, 2007, 2008) and various auction 
designs for selling spectrum rights (for a recent overview of policy-related experiments, 
see Normann and Ricciuti, 2009). 
Another important reason for using experiments is that they make it possible to 
explore and measure behavioral parameters such as risk attitudes, discount rates, 
probability weighting, or predictive abilities in an incentive-compatible way. This paper 
is concerned with social preferences, which are broadly defined as the manner and degree 
to which people care about the well-being of others and about the aggregate outcome. An 
important feature of economic experiments is that participants can earn money, and that 
the money they earn depends on their decisions (which is—next to the ‗no deception‘ 
rule—one of key differences with most experiments in psychology). This ensures that 
subjects are motivated to think about their decisions carefully and to make decisions that 
reflect their true preferences. This is particularly important for studies of social 
preferences and pro-social behavior, because in surveys and questionnaire studies people 
may be tempted to give socially desirable answers: ―Sure, I would be willing to 
cooperate‖ and ―Of course, I would support the needy‖. After all, talk is cheap. In an 
experiment, however, such social responses have material consequences. In other words, 
participants are forced to put their money where their mouth is. 
An important question is whether experimental results can be generalized. There 
are two issues related to this question: The concern that laboratory experiments are too 
simple relative to the environment of interest in the outside world (environmental 
validity) and the concern that the chosen subjects are not representative (population 
validity). With regard to the first concern, it is important to realize that the main purpose 
of an experiment—just like in a theoretical model—is to identify the essential 
environmental variables for the research question at hand. General theoretical principles 
(self-interest, rationality, maximization, equilibrium) can be and often are tested with 
rather abstract experimental designs, whereas in the case of test-bed experiments, more 
effort is made to minimize the distance between the experimental design and the specific 
environment of interest. Moreover, experiments are ideally suited to gradually increase 
the complexity of the environment (principle of decreasing abstraction). This makes it 
possible to trace precisely which factor is responsible for a particular change in the 
observed outcomes.  
The second issue of external validity is the choice of experimental subjects 
(population validity). University students are often used as subjects because they are 
easily available and have relatively low opportunity costs. But the question is whether 
their behavior is indicative of that of ―real people‖. To investigate this question, 
researchers have carried out a number of selective replications of experiments using the 
relevant subjects as participants (the general population, voters, employees, managers, for 
example). Even though some differences are found, the results of these studies indicate 
that the general patterns of behavior of ―real people‖ usually correspond remarkably well 
with those found with student subjects. Having said that, it must surely be acknowledged 
that the experimental method, like any method, has its limitations. Experiments are no 
panacea, but a valuable supplementary source of information. Generally, one can say that 
experimental results are most convincing when they are accompanied by theoretical 
insights and observations from the field. 
 
 
3. Experiments on income distribution and redistribution 
 
To discern the prevalence and shape of people‘s distributional preferences, experimental 
economists make use of ‗distribution experiments‘. In the experimental set-ups that fall 
into this category, subjects have to choose among different distributions of income. 
Basically, a distinction can be made between two approaches to elicit the distributional 
preferences of individuals directly. In the first approach, people make decisions about 
income (re)distribution behind a veil of ignorance: without knowing whether they are in 
an advantaged or disadvantaged (financial) position compared to others. Rawls (1971) 
denotes this as people being in their ―original position‖. These experiments are discussed 
in section 3.1. In the second approach, subjects make individual redistribution decisions 
in front of the veil of ignorance: knowing their own relative standing. Distribution 
decisions in this case are not impartial, and a person‘s own position can influence his or 
her view on what constitutes a fair distribution. These experiments are discussed in 
section 3.2. Finally, section 3.3 covers experiments that deal with strategic interaction: 
games in which individuals are mutually dependent for the achievement of their 
outcomes. Here, the decisions do not directly reveal distributional preferences, but 
choices may still be guided by social preferences as well as a concern for norms of 
fairness and reciprocity. 
 
3.1. Preferences regarding income distributions: behind a veil of ignorance 
 
This section reviews experiments investigating the principles of distributive justice to 
which people adhere. What preferences do individuals have concerning income 
distributions when they are not biased by self-interest? This matters, because policies that 
are aligned with generally shared principles are likely to be accepted more easily than 
those that are opposed to them. Principles of justice are hard to assess in the field, for the 
simple reason that every individual knows his or her position in society (age, gender, 
skill, social background). In particular, people know their position in the income 
distribution, and can by and large predict their absolute and relative future income, 
including the risks they face. This means that notions of justice that are expressed by 
people will unavoidably be colored by self-interest. However, ―objective‖ justice 
principles should relate to a situation in which people do not (yet) know their actual 
position, or, alternatively, a situation in which they are impartial to the outcome. 
 
Experiments investigating principles of justice 
 
One of the first such experimental studies was conducted by Frohlich, 
Oppenheimer and Eavey (1987), followed up by Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1990). Their 
experiments were carried out with the aim to implement the original position (i.e., behind 
the veil of ignorance) in the laboratory. In these experiments, students formed small 
societies in which they had to make ex-ante decisions about the different distributive 
rules to be implemented in the society that they were going to be part of, without 
knowing what their ex-post absolute and relative income position in this society would 
be. Specifically, in the experiment of Frohlich, Oppenheimer, and Eavey (1987), the 
participants had to discuss and unanimously choose one of four distributive principles 
that would be actually implemented after the determination and announcement of each 
subject‘s income position in the society. The four investigated distributive principles were 
as follows: the principle of maximizing the well-being of the worst-off (Rawls, 1971), the 
principle of maximizing average well-being (utilitarian), and two constrained forms of 
maximizing average well-being. When deciding on the distributive principle, participants 
knew that afterwards they would be randomly allocated to an income class and would 
earn an amount that depended on that income class and the chosen distributive principle. 
The main result was that, as a rule, virtually all participants chose a principle that 
maximized average income with some lower bound on the minimum income that the (ex-
post) worst-off participant would receive. Hence, there was a preference for a utilitarian 
society with some safety net, where the choice of a safety net could be ascribed to risk 
aversion of the participants. In the follow-up study, Frohlich and Oppenheimer extended 
that set-up to economies with production, and found qualitatively similar results.  
 Herne and Suojanen (2004) investigate the behavior of participants for two 
different original positions: first, the Rawlsian original position behind the veil of 
ignorance, and second, the Scanlonian original position, which consists of negotiating 
parties that have full knowledge of their personal characteristics as well as economic and 
social circumstances, equal bargaining power, and a desire to reach agreement that no one 
could reasonably reject. Interestingly, the authors found that the Rawlsian outcome was 
implemented much more often when there was no veil of ignorance (60%) than when 
there was (14%). In line with earlier results, however, the most popular distributive 
principle (62%) behind a veil of ignorance was a utilitarian allocation with a constraint 
guaranteeing some minimum income for the worst-off.  
 
Distribution choices by a benevolent dictator — vignette studies 
 
 Besides implementing the original position, a different way to generate 
impartiality is to ask participants to make choices that affect others but not themselves. 
Hence, participants make choices as an impartial referee or—as it is sometimes called—a 
benevolent dictator. An early example is the study of Yaari and Bar-Hillel (1984). Student 
respondents are confronted with different scenarios of how to distribute a bundle of 
commodities in a simple exchange economy. Such surveys are sometimes called vignette 
studies, and often do not involve monetary stakes (and in this sense are not economic 
experiments). Still, they can generate valuable insights. One of the main interests in this 
study was under what circumstances a departure from the equal division will occur, 
which is a very natural and widely accepted justice norm in situations where the engaged 
agents are symmetric in all relevant aspects. The authors argue that a departure from 
equal division requires a justification. Accordingly, the investigated scenarios are 
asymmetric with respect to needs or tastes. Subjects are asked how they would allocate 
12 grapefruits (x1) and 12 avocados (x2) over Jones and Smith, when Jones‘ utility 
function is uJ = 100x1 while that of Smith is uS = 20x1 + 20x2. In the scenario in which the 
utility functions describe the nutritional needs of the individuals, the majority of the 
subjects prefer the allocation (4, 0) for Jones and (8, 12) for Smith, yielding equal 
utilities. However, in the scenario in which the utility functions reflect tastes (liking and 
disliking), the answers are mostly in favor of (12, 0) for Jones and (0, 12) for Smith.  
 A main finding of this research is that differences in needs weigh much heavier 
than differences in tastes do as an argument to depart from the equal division. 
Specifically, in cases of asymmetry in needs, the Rawlsian criterion of maximizing the 
well-being of the worst-off is chosen most often, whereas in cases of asymmetry in tastes 
the utilitarian principle of maximization of the sum (or average) of individual utilities is 
the most popular choice of the uninvolved student respondents.  
 Subsequent research using the vignette technique for eliciting principles of 
distributive justice has introduced production into the environment. Schokkaert and 
Overlaet (1989) compare two scenarios: one in which production depends on effort, and 
one in which production depends on abilities. They find that ―differences [in effort] 
completely overrule all other reasons for income differences‖ (p. 31). Effort differences 
are seen as morally more just arguments for income differences than are differences in 
innate abilities. Schokkaert and Capeau (1991) replicate this finding with respondents 
from the Flemish working population.  
Konow (1996) takes up these results and formulates a theory of fairness, which 
tries to characterize the fairness values people share and to isolate these values from 
situation-specific contexts. Specifically, the author proposes what he calls the 
Accountability Principle as a general rule of fairness. This principle basically says that a 
person‘s fair share should vary with the variables he or she can control (e.g. work effort) 
—but not with variables that he or she cannot control (e.g. genetic differences). Konow 
(1996) validates his theory with telephone interviews and written responses to 
hypothetical scenarios that systematically vary controllable and non-controllable 
variables. Faravelli (2007) investigates whether support for certain principles of 
distributive justice (egalitarianism, Rawlsian maximin, utilitarianism and utilitarianism 
with a floor constraint) varies with the responsibility that individuals bear for the 
produced outcome. One context was neutral; in a second context, one individual 
produced less because of a physical handicap; in a third context, the individual produced 
less because of little effort. The fairness judgments clearly varied with the context. The 
less productive individual is relatively favored (i.e. the maximin principle is chosen) if he 
or she has a handicap, but is relatively disfavored (i.e., the utilitarian principle is chosen) 
if he or she is lazy.  
 
Distributional choices by a benevolent dictator — experimental economic studies 
 
Undoubtedly, important insights can be gained from vignette studies. However, 
these studies are plagued by the fact that there is no guarantee that respondents indeed 
report their true preferences, because neither their own money, nor that of others, is at 
stake. For example, there is no guarantee that respondents take the task seriously or that 
they do not give socially desirable responses. For these reasons, researchers began using 
experiments with real monetary incentives.  
In many of these experiments, variations of the so-called dictator game (DG) are 
implemented (for overviews and interpretations, see Camerer, 2003; List, 2007 and 
Bardsley, 2008). We briefly introduce this game here. In its classical form, the dictator 
game is a two-player game in which one of the players is assigned the role of the 
proposer (the ―dictator‖), and the other player is the receiver. The proposer is given a 
certain money endowment E (for example, 10 Euro), and decides which fraction s of the 
endowment he or she wants to give to the receiver. The latter has only a passive role; he 
or she can only accept the gift.
1
 At the end of the game, the proposer earns (1-s)E, and the 
receiver earns sE. In the classic set-up, anonymity is preserved so that neither knows the 
identity of the other, and the game is played only once so that strategic considerations 
such as reciprocity do not play a role. 
Konow (2000) adopted the standard DG and introduced the third-party DG. The 
experiment consists of two stages. In stage 1, all participants individually generate 
earnings in a real-effort task (preparing letters for mailing). Thereafter, participants are 
matched in pairs, and the sum of their earnings is credited to a joint account of the pair. In 
the second stage in one treatment (‗standard dictator‘), one subject of the pair is chosen to 
distribute the earned money between herself and her matched partner; in another 
treatment (‗benevolent dictator‘), a third party is chosen for this task. Importantly, the 
benevolent dictator‘s earning is independent of the allocation she implements. These two 
variations of the DG allow Konow (2000) to disentangle ‗true‘ distributive justice 
principles (as expressed by the uninvolved benevolent dictator) from justice ideas that are 
intermingled with self-interest (as exhibited by the involved dictator). In a second 
treatment variation, Konow (2000) tests whether the support for the Accountability 
Principle, as observed in survey studies, carries over to situations in which real money is 
at stake. This is achieved by conducting two different versions of the first stage that differ 
in the way in which the real-effort task was rewarded. In the ‗discretionary difference‘ 
treatment, each prepared letter earned the same amount of money—and any differences in 
individual earnings came about through individual differences in productivity in letter 
preparation. In the ‗exogenous difference‘ treatment, participants were given enough time 
                                                 
1Calling this design a ―game‖ is a bit misleading, since the proposer makes a unilateral 
decision that cannot be influenced or changed by the receiver. 
 
such that everybody could produce the same number of letters. Differences in earning 
were generated by randomly assigning different per-letter rewards to the two players.  
The reported results clearly support the accountability principle, and also show 
that allocation decisions when own stakes are involved are indeed strongly influenced by 
self-regarding concerns. More specifically, in the discretionary difference treatments, 
benevolent dictators almost always allocate the pair‘s joint earnings in proportion to the 
individuals‘ contribution in the real-effort task. In stark contrast, in the exogenous 
productivity difference treatment, benevolent dictators allocate the pair‘s joint earnings 
50/50—independent of the differences in individual earnings. In fact, almost 90% of the 
benevolent dictators allocated exactly equal shares. Standard dictators also take the 
accountability principle into account, and show a tendency to allocate joint earnings in 
proportion to individual earnings. However, the application of the principle is somewhat 
biased toward the self-interest of the dictator. Basically, all deviations from proportional 
allocations are in the direction favoring the dictator—and although allocations are 
significantly related to the discretionary input of the recipient, recipients receive only 30 
cents more for every 100 cents more they contribute to the joint earnings. In the 
exogenous differences treatment, standard dictators allocate 50% or less to the 
recipient—and when they allocate in proportion to the arbitrary per-letter rewards, they 
do this when it favors them, indicating the effect of material self-interest.  
Dickinson and Tiefenthaler (2002) used a similar third-party dictator experimental 
design to investigate the difference of fairness conceptions when dealing with allocations 
(inputs) or with outcomes (outputs). Whereas Konow (2000) implicitly induced a utility 
function that is linear in money and the same for everybody, these authors induce non-
linear utility in money income that differs across participants. An important consequence 
of this variation is that equal allocations do not translate to equal money earnings. Similar 
to the Konow (2000) study, recipient-participants in one treatment earned their rights, 
while in another one this was not the case. On aggregate, about 54% of benevolent 
dictators chose an allocation that equalizes the outcomes—whereas only about 4% chose 
an allocation with equal inputs (and unequal outputs). In addition, about 11% chose an 
allocation that maximized the joint outcome but led to unequal individual outcomes. 
When comparing the no-earned rights with the earned-rights treatment, Dickinson and 
Tiefenthaler observed a significant shift away from equal outcomes. While in the former 
case about 62% of all uninvolved dictators chose allocations that equalize outcomes, this 
percentage dropped to about 46% in the latter case. Hence, also in a non-linear (and 
therefore more complex) environment, equality of outcomes and the accountability 
principle seem to be important. An interesting side result of this study is that women 
seem to be less sensitive to the introduction of earned rights than men. Specifically, in the 
earned-rights treatment, 58% of women chose allocations equalizing outcomes 
(compared to only 35% of the male participants).  
In a recent paper, building upon Konow (2000), Konow, Saijo and Akai (2009) 
empirically examine the possible determinants for equity and equality. They specifically 
investigate if and how the relative importance of equity and equality depends on personal 
characteristics and interpersonal factors. In line with earlier evidence, the authors find 
that in impersonal settings participants strongly favor outcomes consistent with equity 
(proportionality). This result is robust to variations in cultural (Japan and US) and 
demographic (age, income, work hours, race, gender) backgrounds of participants. 
Interestingly, however, introducing interpersonal factors and decreasing social distance 
has significant effects—in that it leads to shifting allocations from equity to equality. The 
authors conclude that social preferences are constructed by ‗morals‘ and ‗mores‘—where 
the former refers to the moral preferences people have when they are in the role of a 
neutral non-involved arbitrator, and the latter refers to social preferences activated by 
personal considerations. 
 
Distributive justice and earned rights 
 
Redistribution usually does not take place in an idealistic societal vacuum. When 
pondering just distributions, people may take into account the fact that some positions 
embody some sort of ‗right‘ or ‗claim‘. For instance, in discussions about pension reform, 
some may perceive that people belonging to the older generation have the right to receive 
a certain level of benefits. Such rights and claims are studied by Gächter and Riedl 
(2005, 2006). Pairs of participants acquire asymmetric monetary claims through a real-
effort task. Thereafter, nature decides whether the claims are actually paid out or if the 
parties have to bargain over a smaller pie—where it is impossible to satisfy both claims 
simultaneously. The two participants and the impartial third parties are asked for their 
judgments regarding the just division of the reduced pie. Importantly, the claims are 
economically sunk. Nevertheless, the vast majority of both participants and third parties 
take these claims into account when formulating their judgment regarding fair 
distribution. Specifically, the distribution proportional to the acquired claims figures 
prominently in the proposed allocations. In addition, some preference for progressivity is 
observed, in that the proposed distributions become relatively more equal with increasing 
asymmetries in the claims.  
Chavanne, McCabe and Pia Paganelli (2009) utilize third-party dictator 
experiments to explore redistribution preferences in the presence of entitlements and 
inequalities. Specifically, in their set-up, one of two stakeholders is endowed with money 
and a third-party dictator can redistribute any portion of this endowment to the 
stakeholder without endowment. Hence, the third party has to actively take money away 
from one person to increase the earnings of another. The authors investigate how different 
ways of legitimizing the initial endowment alter the benevolent dictator‘s redistribution 
decision. In one pair of treatments, the endowed position is either assigned randomly or 
through the performance in a test. In another pair of treatments, the amount of 
endowment was either determined randomly or acquired by working on a word-search 
task. The authors find that redistribution takes place—but that it depends on the way in 
which the endowed position and the endowment itself are received. Most redistribution 
takes place when the position and the endowment are randomly assigned. In this case, 
third parties (on average) equalize the earnings of stakeholders. When the endowment 
position or the amount of endowment is earned, only between 35% and 41% are 
redistributed to the party without endowment.  
 
Distributive justice in the face of risk and uncertainty 
 
Despite the prevalence of the risk and uncertainty that accompany everyday life 
and economic activities, all of the surveyed studies on justice principles utilize a 
deterministic amount of income. Only in a recent study by Cappelen et al. (2010) is this 
issue taken up in the experimental literature. These authors investigate fairness views 
about risk taking, and examine whether people‘s ideas regarding justice focus mainly on 
ex ante opportunities or ex post outcomes. The ex ante view (focusing on initial 
opportunities) provides a fairness-based argument for no redistribution of eventual ex 
post gains and losses. In contrast, the ex post view (focusing on outcomes) provides a 
fairness-based rationale for eliminating ex post inequalities coming from risky decisions. 
To experimentally investigate fairness views of risk taking, the authors implemented a 
two-stage design. In the first stage, participants had to choose between risky and safe 
alternatives. Participants in the second stage were paired, and earnings resulting from the 
first-stage decisions were pooled. Participants were then informed about choices and 
outcomes of the risk-taking stage, and had to distribute the pooled earnings. In addition, 
some participants acted as uninvolved third parties (spectators) who did not participate in 
the risk-taking task, and were asked to distribute the pooled income between the two 
involved parties (stakeholders). The authors report the following main results: (i) the 
majority of spectators distribute total earnings equally; however, (ii) many participants 
did not deem it fair to equalize income when there is a difference in risk taking, but found 
it fair if the difference is in luck; (iii) the distribution decisions are independent of the 
costs of avoiding risk and (iv) choices of spectators and stakeholders seem to reflect the 
same set of fairness considerations. 
 
Summary 
Two methods have been used to measure the moral preferences of individuals 
regarding income differences, while controlling for potential biases created by self-
interest. One method is to put people behind a veil of ignorance. Studies show that people 
have a preference for maximizing the average income in society, subject to a floor 
constraint. This can interpreted as saying that people are quite willing to trade off some 
equality if this is compensated by extra efficiency. The second method consists of having 
people choose among income distributions over others as a third-party dictator. The 
results of these studies suggest that full income equality is the normative ideal, and that 
the willingness to deviate from this ideal varies systematically with a number of elements 
in the decision environment. A major element is the reason that lies behind income 
inequalities. Many people in their role as third party seem to follow the accountability 
principle. Income inequalities that arise from factors beyond a person‘s control (luck, 
disability) should be repaired, while inequalities that are within a person‘s control (effort) 
are tolerated. Implementation of the principle, however, also depends on the context. The 
more ‗social‘ the setting and the smaller the social distance, the higher the relative weight 
put on equality versus equity (proportionality). The relative weight on equality is also 
higher for women than for men.  
 
3.2 Preferences regarding income distribution: in front of the veil ignorance 
 
The previous section focused mainly on distribution games in which the allocator is not 
involved—in the sense that own earnings are not at stake when making the distribution 
decision. However, in most circumstances people know their positions, and it is thus 
likely that some tension exists between self serving and social preferences. For such 
situations, experiments again offer a tool with which to investigate the effect of different 
institutional environments in a controlled way. Many experimental setups build on the 
standard DG, as described in the previous section.  
The standard DG was first implemented by Forsythe et al. (1994). They find that 
dictators on average decide to give about $1 of their $5 endowment to the receiver. 
Dozens of replications indicate that this is representative for the outcome of DGs (see 
Camerer, 2003). Typically, more than 60% of the subjects in the role of the allocator 
choose a positive transfer and the mean transfer amounts to approximately 20% of the 
endowment. At the same time, dictators' behavior is very heterogeneous: There is a 
substantial fraction of dictators (about 35%) who give nothing to the receiver; another 
large fraction (25%) give the receiver an equal share, while the rest of the dictators give 
amounts somewhere between these extremes. 
 
The influence of the size of the stakes 
 
One variation of the DG was introduced to examine if it matters whether the 
monetary stakes are real or hypothetical. Forsythe et al. (1994) compare dictator 
decisions for pie sizes of $5 in two treatments. In one, the DG was played with real 
monetary stakes; in the other, the stakes were merely hypothetical. They find that the 
hypothetical decisions were more generous than the real ones, and reject the hypothesis 
that the distributions of proposals are the same in both treatments. Sefton (1992) and 
Krawczyk and Le Lec (2008) find similar results. The latter conclude, ―sharing equally in 
dictator game-like situations may be a socially-desirable norm of behavior, which 
however is quite easily overridden when (sufficient) monetary incentives come into 
play‖.  
Is giving behavior sensitive to the size of the pie to be distributed? Comparing two 
treatments capturing non-hypothetical decisions, with stakes of US$5 and US$10, 
Forsythe et al. (1994) find no significant effect on giving behavior. However, the 
difference in pie sizes is only US$5. Carpenter et al. (2005) implement a larger difference 
of $90. They find that increasing the stakes from $10 to $100 has no statistically 
significant effect on behavior in the DG. Similarly, List and Cherry (2008) find no 
significant difference between allocations comparing a DG with stakes of $20 and $100. 
Hence, it seems that the results from dictator games are not an artifact of the relatively 
small stakes involved. 
 
The process that generates income and decision power 
 
Do distributional preferences depend on whether the initial endowments are 
earned or not, and do they depend on whether the role of the dictator is earned or 
randomly assigned?  
Hoffman et al. (1994) report an experiment in which subjects could earn being in 
the advantaged role of the dictator. Subjects first took part in a general knowledge quiz 
where those with the best performance were assigned the role of the dictator. The 
receivers in this contest-entitlement treatment ended up with a much lower payoff than 
those in the control treatment where the roles where allocated randomly as in the standard 
DG. Subjects among the top performers in the knowledge quiz seemingly felt they had 
earned their position and thus a property right over their initial endowment. 
 Jakiela (2009) reports the results of a comparison between a standard DG and the 
―taking game‖, where the dictator‘s partner holds the whole endowment in the beginning. 
She finds that dictators allocate themselves a larger share when they themselves are 
endowed, with the endowment being determined by luck, than when their partner is 
endowed with the money and reallocation means to actively take money away. In an 
additional set of treatments, the standard DG was preceded by a piece-rate effort task 
(sorting dried beans out of a bucket) that determined the subjects‘ endowments. The 
author finds that subjects allocate more to themselves when they earn their endowment 
compared to when they win it. Similarly, Oxoby and Spraggon (2008) report that in the 
standard DG dictators allocate on average 20% to the receivers, whereas when the 
dictator had earned  the wealth, transfers were close to zero. On the other hand, if the 
receiver had earned the wealth, dictators sometimes even gave more than 50% of the pie 
to the receiver. This suggests that legitimizing of assets creates property rights that 
participants tend to respect, regardless of whether the powerful or the powerless 
accumulate these rights (see also Ruffle, 1998; List, 2007; Krawczyk and Le Lec, 2008; 
List and Cherry, 2008; Durante and Putterman , 2009). 
Is the earnings-based notion of justice as distinctive, if high productivity is mainly 
due to pure talent than if it is due to the effort that is put into production? The experiment 
reported in Cappelen et al. (2007) is informative with respect to that question. As in the 
experiments reviewed above, the distribution phase is preceded by a production phase 
where subjects are asked to choose how much of their endowment to invest in two 
different games. An exogenously given rate of return determines each player‘s eventual 
contribution - those with a high rate of return would quadruple their effort investment, 
whereas those with a low rate of return would merely double it. In the distribution phase, 
subjects are paired with players differing with respect to their rate of return for the two 
games, are informed about the opponent‘s investment, rate of return and the total 
contribution. They are then asked to decide about how to distribute the total income like 
in a conventional DG game. The results show that many participants distinguish between 
factors that are within subject‘s control (investment/effort) and those that are exogenous 
(rate of return/talent) in the sense that they only perceive inequalities due to factors 
within individual control as justifiable. 
 Social identity and social distance 
 
Other factors that are found to affect distributional preferences are social identity 
and social distance. Hoffman et al. (1994) employed a so-called double-blind procedure 
which guaranteed complete anonymity, in the sense that neither the experimenter nor the 
other subjects could observe a subject‘s decision and payoff. The authors find that under 
such a strict anonymity setting, a majority of dictators (64%) give nothing to the receiver, 
while in Forsythe et al. (1994) only 36 % give nothing (see also Hoffman et al., 1996). 
Charness and Gneezy (2008) examine the opposite effect of decreasing social 
distance on giving behavior in a DG by comparing behavior in the classic DG approach 
with a treatment in which participants knew the family name of the subject they were 
matched with. When the names were known, dictators were significantly more generous 
and allocated a higher portion to the receiver (see also Johannesson and Persson, 2000). 
Recently, Leider et al. (2009), D‘Excelle and Riedl (2010) and Goeree et al. (2010) 
investigated dictator giving behavior in real existing social networks of Harvard 
undergraduates, female high school students, and household heads of a village in rural 
Nicaragua, respectively. The authors mapped the friendship network as well as other 
social and economic links (D‘Excelle and Riedl, 2010), which makes it possible to 
calculate the social distance between any two people in the network. Thereafter, people in 
the investigated networks participated in a series of DGs, with some being dictators and 
others receivers. In all three studies, dictator giving significantly decreased with larger 
social distances. 
Klor and Shayo (2010) study the effects of social identity (group membership) on 
voting over redistribution. Subjects were divided into two groups according to their field 
of study. They were randomly assigned different income levels and were informed about 
their own income, the overall mean income and the mean income of each group. 
Thereafter, they voted anonymously over a redistributive tax regime which was 
determined by majority rule. The tax revenue would then be equally distributed among all 
subjects. This procedure was repeated 40 times without giving subjects information about 
the effective tax rate and their individual payoff after each round. Comparing subject‘s 
behavior to a treatment in which subjects didn‘t know about the group assignment, the 
authors find that identification with a group indeed affects redistribution preferences. 
More than a third of the subjects (most of them facing a cost of opting for the well-being 
of their group that was not too high) didn‘t maximize their payoff, but chose the tax rate 
that was best for the average member of their group. The authors can exclude other 
motives like e.g. efficiency concerns or inequality aversion as being accountable for the 
observed behavioral differences. 
 
Gender, age and ideology 
 
As mentioned before, there is a substantial degree of heterogeneity in social 
preferences and some observable individual characteristics seem to differentiate those 
who give more from those who give less. Several papers allude to the relationship of 
gender and giving behavior (for a recent survey, see Croson and Gneezy, 2009). Eckel 
and Grossman (1998) report the results of a double-blind DG. They find that women are 
more generous than men: on average, men give half of what women give to their 
anonymous partner. Bolton and Katok (1995), in contrast, find no gender difference when 
investigating dictator‘s choices applying only subject-subject anonymity. Cox and Deck 
(2006) compare behavior across genders in allocation decisions and conclude that 
behavioral differences between men and women are context dependent. Women tend to 
be more generous than men when social distance is low (social separation between the 
subject and all other people that are present for the experiment), monetary cost of 
generosity is low (forgone amount of money when subject chooses a generous action), 
and when there is an absence of reciprocal motivation (as in the DG).  
Apart from the effect of gender, Bellemare et al. (2008) find that older people 
have a stronger preference for income equality than younger people (< 35 years).  
Perhaps unsurprisingly, ideological orientations are also strongly related to 
redistribution preferences. Esarey et al. (2009) find that survey measures of individuals' 
economic ideologies can predict their preferences for redistribution programs that 
combine income equalization and social insurance. In the first stage of their experiment, 
an individual production task determined each subject‘s endowment. In the second stage, 
each individual within one treatment faced the same probability of losing 80% of the 
endowment . Subjects were asked to vote on an income redistribution plan, a tax rate 
between 0 and 100 percent, which would be deduced from their incomes before the 
potential occurrence of the random shock, where the median of the choices became the 
effective tax rate for the following periods. The tax revenue would then be equally 
distributed among all subjects. More economically liberal subjects (as assessed with a 
questionnaire) voted for higher tax rates than the more economically conservative ones – 
however, only in the treatment with a moderate risk of a random shock. The authors 
interpret this as liberals acting in accordance with the idea that individuals should be 
protected from bad luck, while conservatives act in accordance with the idea that bad 
luck is ―something to be suffered and good luck […] something to be enjoyed‖ (Esarey et 
al., 2009, p.5). 
 
The role of institutions: markets and politics 
 
In most of the experiments reviewed above, the decision maker (dictator) has 
absolute power over the income distribution. The advantage of such a setup is that it 
gives a very clear and direct view on people‘s social preferences. In reality, of course, 
distributional outcomes take shape in a much richer institutional context, which may 
constrain or facilitate the intensity of revealed social preferences.  
Experiments have shown, for example, that market competition can be an 
important check on the role of distributional preferences (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). Even 
if all players on one side of a market prefer an equitable outcome, the competition 
between them might still lead to quite an unequal result. The reason is that an individual 
player has no control over the outcome, and that coordination is usually difficult to 
achieve. Interestingly, the reverse may also be true. In some important circumstances the 
presence of social preferences can nullify the impact of competition on market outcomes 
(Fehr and Falk, 1999). For instance, wage cuts are rarely observed even in times of high 
unemployment, because managers fear that employees may respond with less effort and 
more on-the-job consumption.  
Also political institutions may interact in intricate ways with distributional 
preferences, as some experimental studies have shown. Tyran and Sausgruber (2006) 
experimentally study the effect of voting on redistribution. They artificially create poor, 
middle class and rich subjects by giving them different initial endowments. While 
classical theory assuming narrow self-interest predicts that only the poor would vote for 
redistribution, the authors find that, next to the poor, also 70% of the middle class and 
even one-third of the rich voted for redistribution from the rich to the poor. Cabrales, 
Nagel and Rodriguez Mora (2006) find a seemingly opposite result, namely that majority 
voting does not lead to redistribution. An important difference with the previous study, 
however, is that differences in income are not just random and exogenous, but are partly 
endogenous and determined by the costly effort individuals exert. Clearly, this reduces 
the willingness of the rich to vote for redistribution. 
 
3.3 Strategic interaction and redistribution 
 
Often, redistribution also involves a strategic element. When the decision about sharing 
risks is made before uncertainty about the individual outcomes is resolved, individuals 
may beforehand agree that the lucky should support the unlucky. When the risk has 
materialized, however, the lucky may have an incentive to reconsider the agreement. 
Therefore, in the absence of enforceable contracts, voluntary risk sharing is akin to a 
social dilemma. It is in the players‘ joint interest that everyone cooperates and sticks to 
the agreement, but individual players may have an incentive to defect and renegotiate. 
Several experiments have examined how people resolve the conflict between joint 
interest and self-interest. Are people willing to cooperate, to share risks, or do they take a 
―free ride‖ whenever they can? Which factors determine whether a cooperative outcome 
is attainable? What does this tell us about people‘s social preferences? 
 
Risk sharing and insurance games 
 
Selten and Ockenfels (1998) introduced the so called Solidarity Game, which 
offers a basic set-up for investigating redistribution preferences when people are exposed 
to risk. Each of three players has a chance of 2/3 to receive an income of 10 DM, and a 
chance of 1/3 to receive 0 DM. Before the players know whether they receive 10 DM or 0 
DM, each player is asked how much he or she is willing to give to a player who receives 
0 DM in the event that he or she receives 10 DM. Thus, subjects can share risks ex post 
here, but there is no strategic element involved since it is a one-shot game. Are the 
winners willing to compensate the losers, and how does this depend on the number of 
losers? The results indicate that 79% of the winners are willing to transfer a positive 
amount to the loser(s). Remarkably, for 50% of the winners the total amount they were 
willing to transfer (about 3 DM) did not depend on whether there were one or two losers. 
This implies that a single loser would receive a total transfer of 6 DM (3 DM from each 
winner), leading to a very equitable income distribution (7-7-6)—whereas two losers 
would each receive only 1.5 DM, leading to a very skewed income distribution (7-1.5-
1.5). 
 Charness and Genicot (2009) experimentally investigate a voluntary risk-sharing 
game. In the experiment a subject is matched with another subject and each is endowed 
with a fixed income. Additionally, in each period it is randomly determined who of the 
two subjects in a pair would get an extra amount on top. After both outcomes are 
observed, subjects can choose to transfer money to the other subject. This part of the 
game is similar to a DG. One difference is that not only the rich but also the poor players 
can make a transfer. Additionally there is a strategic element included since the game is 
played repeatedly and subjects stay with their partner for an uncertain number of periods 
based on a certain continuation probability after each period. After that subjects are 
matched with a new partner and play the game again. The game segments vary with 
respect to whether the fixed incomes are equal or unequal. Finally, one of the periods is 
randomly determined to be relevant for payment.  The authors find that subjects do share 
risks, with higher transfers coming from subjects who got the extra amount. However, 
also the other side often makes a small transfer - the authors speculate that this might be a 
signal of intent. They also find evidence for reciprocal behavior in the sense that a 
subject‘s transfer is higher the higher the first transfer made by his partner. The more risk 
averse subjects are and the higher the continuation probability, the higher the level of risk 
sharing. Inequality in fixed incomes instead leads to a decrease in risk sharing. 
 Charness and Genicot (2009) investigate risk sharing without commitment 
whereas in Barr and Genicot (2008) the level of commitment is varied. The authors 
conduct a field experiment in Zimbabwe: First subjects have the choice between 6 
gambles varying in average return and riskiness. In round 1 of the experiment subjects 
play this gamble choice game individually, the possibility of risk sharing being excluded. 
Before taking part in round 2, subjects are invited to form risk sharing groups, implying 
that all members of one sharing group would pool the money they won in the gambles 
and distribute it equally among all group members. In two of the treatments, once a 
subject decides to opt into the collective insurance, there is still the possibility to opt-out, 
either in public of private, after a subject‘s personal outcome is observed. However, in a 
third treatment subjects face full commitment, so if they decide to join a sharing group 
this is an effective decision and they don‘t have the possibility to change their mind when 
being informed about their individual outcome. The authors find that subjects in the latter 
treatment are more likely to form risk sharing groups. Only 31% do not join a risk 
sharing group whereas in the other two treatments about 60% do not join. Additionally, 
subjects in the full commitment treatment take more risks in the gamble choice game. On 
average the groups formed in that treatment are larger and include 6.9 people compared 
to 6.5 in the treatment with private defection and 4 in that with public defection. 
Chaudhuri, Gangadharan and Maitra (2010) investigate risk sharing in groups (5 
vs. 25 members) that play together for at least 20 periods but face uncertainty about the 
exact number of periods. In each period subjects are first informed about the outcome of 
a random draw that determines their endowment for this period - they either get a high or 
low endowment. Additionally, they get to know how many other people in the group 
received a high endowment. Then they are asked how much money they want to place in 
a group account which would be equally distributed among all members of the group. 
This so called insurance game is a game of collective action with heterogeneous 
endowments among subjects. When making their decision about how much to put into 
the group account in a certain period, subjects face the uncertainty about how much other 
group members will actually contribute. Repeated play may trigger strategic 
considerations based on the expectation of reciprocal behavior since subjects are 
uncertain about their endowments in the following periods. The number of group 
members with a high or low endowment may differ between periods. The authors find 
that in small groups contributions to the pool are significantly higher compared to large 
groups, but that there is no complete risk sharing. In groups that are self-selected, by 
requiring subjects to register for the experiment as a group, risk sharing is significantly 
higher than in non self-selected groups.   
 
Overlapping generations and intergenerational transfers 
 
A temporal structure particularly relevant in the domain of pensions and health 
insurance is that of a sequence of overlapping generations. For example, in a pay-as-you-
go (PAYG) system the currently retired generation is supported by the currently working 
generation; when the latter generation retires, they will be supported by the next 
generation (and so on). Such a system of intergenerational transfers, however, may suffer 
from a temporal credibility problem. What is the guarantee that the currently working 
generation will receive the same level of support from the next generation, once they 
retire? Every working generation may experience an incentive to reconsider the level of 
support to the currently old generation. One behavioral mechanism that could make a 
PAYG system self-enforcing is that of intergenerational reciprocity. The present 
generation receives support in relation to the support they gave to the previous generation 
(Hammond, 1975, Kotlikoff et al., 1988). 
Van der Heijden et al. (1998a) use experiments to examine the relevance of such 
cross-generational reciprocity (see also Offerman, Potters and Verbon, 2001). They 
employ a simple overlapping-generations game that abstracts from all complexities that 
could blur the view on this central idea. The game consists of a sequence of players 
(generations). Each player lives for two periods. In the first period, the (young) player has 
a high income; in the second period, the (old) player has a low income. Players cannot 
save, so that efficient income smoothing is possible only through intergenerational 
transfers. Player (generation) Pt decides on the transfer (pension) Tt to player Pt-1; player 
Pt+1 decides on the transfer Tt+1 to player Pt; player Pt+2 decides on the transfer Tt+2 to 
player Pt+1, and so on. The experiment examines whether there is a positive relationship 
between Tt+1 and Tt. Is the transfer that a player receives from the next player related to 
the transfer that this player gave to the previous player? Moreover, the paper examines 
whether such intergenerational reciprocity increases the viability of a PAYG transfer 
scheme. For that purpose, two information treatments are implemented. In one treatment, 
a player knows Tt-1 when deciding upon Tt. In the other treatment, a player does not know 
Tt 1 when deciding upon Tt. Obviously, the latter treatment rules out any role for 
monitoring and reciprocity. 
The results of the experiment are clear. There is no evidence whatsoever for 
intergenerational reciprocity. The level of the transfer in period t+1 is unrelated to the 
level of the transfer in period t. Player t is neither rewarded nor punished by player t+1 
for the way he or she treated player t-1. This result is corroborated by the finding that the 
average level of transfers is the same in the two information treatments. It makes no 
difference whether or not the previous levels of transfers can be observed. Still, the 
average level of transfers can be considered quite high. The payoffs in the game would be 
equal to 9 without transfers (individual rationality), and 25 with optimal transfers 
(collective rationality). With the observed level of transfers, the realized average payoff is 
21. So, it might be said that a fairly efficient voluntary pension system emerges. This is 
quite remarkable, in view of the fact that no commitment possibilities are available. A 
standard game theoretical analysis based on purely selfish agents would predict no 
transfers at all. 
 Some extensions of this pension game have been studied experimentally. One of 
these allows for private (retirement) savings besides the option to use intergenerational 
transfers for that purpose (van der Heijden et al., 1997). The results show that the 
possibility of individual savings erodes the support for intergenerational transfers. This 
occurs, despite the fact that—in the experiment—intergenerational transfers are more 
efficient than private savings. The main attraction of private savings in comparison to a 
PAYG system is that the former suffer none of the uncertainty of the latter that the system 
will be maintained to the same degree in the future.  
 Güth et al. (2002) study an overlapping-generations experiment with multiple 
‗families‘ in which two types of intergenerational transfers are possible. A generation can 
make voluntary transfers (St) to the previous generation (essentially a PAYG pension to 
their parents). In addition, a generation can make a transfer (Gt) to the next generation 
(essentially an investment in the human capital and, thus, the earnings potential of their 
children). One of the aims of the experiment is to investigate the relationship between 
St+1 and St, as well as the relationship between St+1 and Gt. In other words, is a generation 
(when old) rewarded for how it treated its parents and/or for how it treated its children? 
The experimental results suggest that in fact both types of relationships are rather weak. 
Again, reciprocity—direct or indirect—does not seem to be a major factor in explaining 
the support for intergenerational transfers.  
 
 
4. The main lessons 
 
Principles of redistributive justice are utilitarian with a floor constraint  
 
People share certain principles of redistributive justice when they are behind a veil of 
ignorance. They are willing to trade off some inequality for some efficiency. They neither 
want to implement the Rawlsian rule that makes the potentially worst-off better-off, 
disregarding efficiency, nor do they want to stick to pure utilitarianism (Harsanyi, 1955), 
which maximizes total utility independent of the distribution of individual well-being. 
Rather, the most preferred rule of justice is utilitarianism combined with a safety net for 
the poorest. In other words, people find it acceptable that some individuals are worse-
off—as long as they are not too disadvantaged—and if this is compensated by a larger 
number of other people being better-off.  
 
People are averse to inequality, but this aversion varies with the source of inequality 
 
In symmetric situations in which people do not differ from each other in important 
aspects, the equal division or equal sharing norm is prevalent. In asymmetric situations, 
shared distribution norms seem also to exist—even if these norms lead to inequality. 
People thus seem quite tolerant of inequality under certain conditions. The acceptance of 
inequality strongly depends on the source of inequality. Accountability (Konow 1996) 
and equity—in the sense of proportionality—are the leading principles. Income 
inequalities are acceptable when they can be traced back to factors within people‘s 
control—but not if they are the result of factors beyond their control.  
 
Social preferences are relevant even if the veil of ignorance has been lifted 
 
Experiments have shown not only that people share justice ideas when their own material 
well-being is not at stake, but that they care for the well-being of others and for the 
aggregate outcome even if it comes at material cost to themselves. People leave money 
on the table for anonymous others, even if they could easily get away with taking 
everything.  
 
Social preferences display a self-serving bias 
 
If people know their own position in society, preferences for redistribution are strongly 
colored by self-interest. This is especially important in situations in which people are not 
symmetric. While people easily agree that equality is a good fairness norm when 
everybody is equal in all of the aspects deemed important, people tend to disagree on the 
fairness norm when they differ with regard to important characteristics. For instance, in 
asymmetric situations, disadvantaged people tend to favor equality, whereas the 
advantaged propagate proportionality. Moreover, individuals in an advantaged position 
typically have a different perspective on accountability than do those in a disadvantaged 
position. What is deemed to be within or beyond a person‘s range of control varies across 
individuals, depending on their own interests on the matter. This is reminiscent of what 
psychologists call ‗attribution bias‘, according to which people tend to claim successes as 
being due to merit, while explaining failure as a result of bad fortune. 
 
Social preferences depend on the income-generation process 
 
Accountability is not only important for redistributive justice but also shapes preferences 
for redistribution in front of the veil of ignorance. People are much more willing to 
redistribute income at a personal cost when they feel that the recipient deserves it. It is 
easier to accept redistribution in favor of low-income earners whose low income is due to 
bad luck than when the low income is due to low individual efforts. Similarly, 
redistribution towards less productive people is more easily accepted if the low 
productivity is beyond one‘s responsibility.  
 
Social preferences are heterogeneous 
 
Although social preferences are ubiquitous, not all people reveal social preferences. In 
addition, those who reveal social preferences do show significant variation in how 
strongly they take the well-being of others into account. Much of this observed 
heterogeneity is still unexplained, but a few personal characteristics show significant 
correlation with expressed social preferences. Women seem to be more generous than 
men, but their generosity is also more sensitive with respect to environmental specifics. 
Furthermore, older people seem to be more sensitive regarding income inequalities than 
are younger people. Real and perceived social distance between the persons involved in 
the redistribution also explains parts of the variation in expressed social preferences, with 
preferences for redistribution increasing with decreasing social distance. 
 
Effect of political and economic institutions is ambiguous 
 
Market competition constrains the impact of social preferences on outcomes—but the 
reverse is also true. Whether political institutions constrain or facilitate the impact of 
social preferences is largely unexplored. What existing studies have shown is that 
political institutions interact with social preferences in a non-trivial way, and that the 
specifics of the setting may tip the impact one way or another. 
 
Social preferences are fragile 
 
Social preferences are not only heterogeneous; their expression is also sensitive to 
institutional specifics and to beliefs about the social preferences of others. The 
willingness to redistribute income is sometimes influenced by economically unimportant 
details of the decision environment. In addition, generosity and cooperation is often 
conditional—in the sense that it is only expressed if people believe that others are also 
generous and cooperative. This implies an important role for expectations and trust for 
the support of redistribution schemes. 
 
Social preferences across generations 
 
The experimental evidence on altruism and social preferences across generations delivers 
a clear and to some extent surprising picture. There is no evidence for intergenerational 
reciprocity, in the sense that a generation that received support from the previous 
generation is more likely to support the next. Subsequent generations supported each 
other more or less unconditionally.  
 
 
5. Perspectives for further experimental research 
 
The experimental evidence we have surveyed convincingly shows that most people take 
into account their own justice principles or the perceived fairness ideas of others when 
deciding on distributive tasks—be these decisions taken in solitary circumstances or 
taken in situations where they have to interact with others. Pensions and social insurances 
are inherently (re)distributive, and this evidence is therefore important when one wishes 
to discuss individual and political pension and insurance options in an informed way. 
What is largely missing in the experimental designs is some reflection of the fact that 
(re)distributional decisions have a time dimension and are prone to risk and uncertainty. 
These time, risk and uncertainty perspectives are particularly important for pensions and 
social insurance. 
Therefore, a first set of research questions may tackle issues regarding principles 
of justice when the consequences take immediate effect (or only with some delay)—and 
only affect the present generation (or also later generations). The surveyed studies have 
shown that justice principles allow for inequalities if they can be linked to circumstances 
for which a person can be made accountable. If we translate this to the pensions problem, 
then the idea of accountability implies that people may be willing to accept that others 
receive higher pension payments if, for instance, this is based on higher productivity due 
to training followed —but will be less willing to do so if the higher productivity is based 
on pure talent or luck. An important complicating factor with pensions is that these 
principles affect not (only) one‘s own generation but (also) other generations. The 
sustainability of a pension system based on intergenerational solidarity calls for both an 
extension of justice principles across generations and solidarity between different social 
classes within a generation. Not much is known about the fairness ideas of people in such 
situations. How should the benefits be distributed between different income classes and 
across generations? Perhaps even more important is the question of how the burden in 
times of distress should be distributed between generations and social classes. A similar 
quandary applies to social insurance, where the benefits and costs have to be distributed 
between people with different income (potential) and different risks. A first small step in 
analyzing fairness ideas in such contexts was taken by Cappelen et al. (2010) in their 
study of the fairness perceptions of risk-taking. However, many questions remain: What 
is the fairness perception of the trade-off between risk-taking and income? To what extent 
should a person who deliberately took a high risk and earned good income through good 
luck be made accountable for the good income? Should she be treated differently from a 
person who opted for low risk and had bad luck? These are important questions at the 
heart of any social insurance scheme.  
The above briefly discusses possible research into the normative basis of pension 
and social insurance schemes when people place themselves outside the scheme. In 
reality, however, people are often stakeholders in such schemes. The research on 
distribution problems clearly indicates that the distribution decisions of stakeholders are 
influenced by the trade-off between fairness and material self-interest. A similar trade-off 
is to be expected when it comes to decisions about the distribution of benefits and costs 
regarding pension and social insurance schemes. Having established the underlying 
normative foundations in distributional decisions in which the time and risk dimension 
play an important role, the logical next step involves investigating the effect of personal 
involvement, in the context of seeking to know more about the sustainability of particular 
pension and social security schemes. Interesting and important variations and extensions 
of experimental designs come again from the very nature of pensions and social 
insurance. For instance, self-interest may also influence behavior via historically grown 
entitlements, a phenomenon observed in experimental bargaining and negotiations, but 
not yet experimentally examined in the context of redistribution between different income 
classes and generations. 
In democracies, decisions about the redistributive consequences of pensions and 
social insurance are not implemented dictatorially but via a political process. Therefore, it 
is important to extend the small body of literature on the political economy of 
(re)distribution to the area of pensions and insurance. In future, it will be important to 
extend this aspect into an inter-generational setting with and without the involvement of 
risk and uncertainty. Building on experimental research into the justice principles 
regarding (re)distribution within and between generations, one can design institutions that 
maximize political support for sustaining and/or reforming economically meaningful 
pension and social insurance systems.  
 
 
6. Conclusions and implications 
 
This paper surveys the experimental evidence that deals with a major constituent element 
of solidarity: redistribution. While the evidence clearly shows that people share some 
basic willingness to support redistribution in general, the evidence also points to the 
limits to this support, which are influenced by various factors such as the source of 
inequality, social and personal characteristics and the institutional environment in which 
such redistribution takes place. The structure and distributional consequences of 
solidarity-based pension schemes have to be in line with generally shared fairness norms, 
and must take into account their limits. Otherwise, these schemes will lose societal 
support, and open to door to a host of adverse consequences.  
An important message is that inequalities among people with unequal 
characteristics are acceptable to a large majority as long as there are good reasons for 
these inequalities, and if this acceptance does not lead to inefficiencies. In particular, the 
support for redistribution depends crucially on the sources of the inequality. One could 
argue that these distributional preferences reflect the possible disincentive effects of full 
insurance against all income risk, such as the incidence of income insurance on effort 
supply and other moral hazard effects. This requires that individuals bear at least part of 
the adverse consequences of their choices. It implies that if one wants to organize support 
for solidarity and redistribution, it is probably much less effective to emphasize the fact 
that the recipients need the support than it is to stress that they deserve the support. 
Importantly, such emphasis has to be transparent, because social preferences—and 
therefore support for re-distributional schemes implied in pension systems—have been 
shown to be fragile with respect to perceived injustices. Such transparent policies are also 
important because people‘s tendency to apply justice principles in a self-serving way may 
undermine solidarity when there is too much room left for idiosyncratic interpretations.  
It has been suggested that the sustainability of collective pension schemes can be 
furthered by increasing the actuarial fairness and by reducing the (ex ante) redistribution 
embodied in the system. One proposal is to make contributions dependent on observable 
risk characteristics. Experimental evidence suggests, however, that such a proposal will 
probably not meet with much popular support if the characteristics involved are beyond a 
person‘s control (such as gender or age). There is likely to be much more approval if the 
differentiation is based on characteristics that can be reasonably expected to be due to a 
person‘s free choice (such as career decisions and having a partner or not). Generally, one 
may say that a collective pension scheme that reflects proportionality of benefits relative 
to the provided inputs, and that takes into account a person‘s accountability for his or her 
choices, will enjoy relatively strong support from the population. There is, however, a 
caveat to be made. 
Although political and ideological differences usually do not lead to controversies 
about the underlying principles of fairness and justice, such controversies surface when it 
comes to the interpretation of these principles. Both left and right, rich and poor, men and 
women, Europeans and Americans by and large agree that people should suffer the 
consequences (and enjoy the fruits) of outcomes for which they can be held accountable. 
However, as soon as one starts trying to define for what precisely people can be held 
accountable, disagreement starts. For example, some will argue that talents and capacities 
are due to merit and education, or perhaps are a gift from God; others may perceive them 
as merely due to chance. Similarly, the rich may argue that their wealth is due to their 
own efforts and to the risks they have taken during their life, while the poor may claim 
that their low wealth level is largely due to bad luck. However, a number of virtually 
indisputable characteristics might form a basis upon which proportionality and 
accountability within a pension system could be based. For instance, few people will 
argue that individuals should be held accountable for their age or their longevity. This 
may partly explain the unfailing support for pension schemes, in general, and for 
intergenerational solidarity, in particular. 
An important issue uncovered in some of the surveyed research is that 
entitlements (or moral property rights) can strongly shape the perception of fair 
distributions. Existing pension systems also create such entitlements, which makes it 
difficult to implement necessary reforms in the face of current and future financial 
distress. The political conflicts surrounding efforts to increase the retirement age reflect 
how strongly entitlements can be perceived. Whether or not such entitlements are 
justified, policies targeting reforms that change such entitlements have to take them 
seriously into account. 
Experiments also indicate that the strength of social preferences is decreasing 
with social distance. If people do not feel that others belong to the same group in one way 
or another, they are less likely to feel responsible for their well-being. The support for 
redistribution via pension systems is crucially dependent on a sense of shared identity. 
This suggests that there is an upper bound on the level and scale at which solidarity and 
risk sharing can be organized. Even though efficiency and economies of scale may 
sometimes dictate that risk pooling be organized at a high level of aggregation, the 
support for the redistribution that such risk sharing entails is likely to decrease at higher 
levels of aggregation, especially in times of hardship. 
Finally, we have seen that mutually beneficial voluntary risk sharing does occur—
but often fails to reach efficient levels, even when the conditions seem relatively 
favorable. While this failure seems partly due to bounded rationality, another important 
element is lack of trust. This trust is fostered in a number of ways. One of these factors is 
the shadow of the future; another is the absence of outside options. Recent developments 
on the labor market, however, may erode both of these factors. In particular, increased 
mobility on the labor market may well erode employees‘ sense of identification with their 
employer and with their colleagues—and also decrease the period of time that employees 
are in the same pension fund. From this perspective, it is quite understandable that the 
support for solidarity is under stress.  
The upshot, in short, is that solidarity must be organized—even when there is 
broad consensus on the underlying principles of fairness and distributive justice.  
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